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Immanence, Pluralism, and Politicsi 
Matthew J. Moore11 
The article examines whether theories based on an immanent 
worldview- roughly, one that denies the existence of 
transcendent principle or agents relevant to human life- offer a 
better solution to the problems of political pluralism than do 
transcendent theories. After reviewing three such theories- one 
from Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, one from Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and one from William Connally­
the author argues that theories like Connolly's, which both 
make posttlve claims and explicitly acknowledge the 
contestability of those claims, are the most defensible. At the 
same time, even those theories run into the problems of 
transcendent theories, especially relying on assumptions they 
cannot prove. Thus, the author suggests that we may need to be 
more modest in our expectations of how persuasive any such 
theory can be.  
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INTRODUCTION 
One main focus of contemporary political theory has been the issue of 
value pluralism. 1 The basic concern is both clear and troubling: to the 
extent that people disagree in their moral judgments, it may be difficult 
or even impossible to create political institutions and rules that are 
acceptable to everyone. That appears to create a dilemma: either we will 
have to accept a very limited kind of political cooperation, restricted to 
those issues on which we can find common ground (as, for example, 
Chandran Kukathas argues2 ) , or we will have to accept that every society 
will inevitably impose its institutions and rules onto some citizens who 
do not recognize their legitimacy and feel themselves to be both 
oppressed by and trapped within their polity. 
While this may at first glance appear to be a problem that is internal to 
political liberalism, with its special concern for eliciting the willing 
consent of the governed and avoiding imposing nonconsensual 
obligations, the problem of value pluralism is a political universal. Every 
conception of politics has to in some way explain why some citizens 
reject the institutions and rules of the society, and every actual polity has 
to figure out how to deal with fundamental dissent, both as a practical 
problem and as an ethical problem. 
Thinking abstractly, there are three possible responses to this problem. 
First, we might discount the reasons of dissidents (as mental illness, self­
interest masquerading as principle, sedition, ignorance, and so on) and 
simply impose our institutions and rules despite their disagreement. 
That's certainly a possible response, and I doubt that anything I write 
here could change the mind of someone who was committed to such a 
course of action. However, my bet is that most people have seen how 
cynically this strategy can be used as a way to reinforce the power of 
elites, and thus that most readers will agree that moral arguments need 
moral, not just coercive, responses. Second, we might believe that at 
some point in the future all human beings will come to hold the same 
moral values, and will apply them the same way to circumstances, such 
that moral disagreement will no longer be a problem. (Similarly, we 
might believe that human beings will at some point abandon the 
idea/language ofmorality itself, which would lead to the same outcome.) 
Many anarchists and some Marxists (not to mention many moral 
philosophers) hold this view, seeing moral disagreement as ultimately the 
product of inequality and/or ignorance. While that position may of 
course ultimately tum out to be correct, it doesn't offer us any practical 
guidance about what to do today, and thus isn't an adequate response to 
the practical problem of value pluralism. For the foreseeable future , in 
every existing society, the problem of value pluralism is both real and 
apparently inevitable. We need some acceptable, concrete, political 
response to it. Third and finally, we might hope that we could identify 
some argument (and perhaps some corresponding rules and institutions) 
that everyone could in fact agree with, thus overcoming the 
disagreement. Most of the recent work on value pluralism has pursued 
this strategy (as has a great deal of related work, for example that of John 
Rawls3 ). 
While a handful of writers have argued that the problem of value 
pluralism is intractable, such that no conceivable argument or course of 
action could entirely resolve it, 4 the majority of people working on this 
problem have sought various strategies to arrive at agreement. Many 
such theories are transcendental- that is, their response to plurality is 
based on identifying supra-human principles that do or should constrain 
human behavior, and that, in principle, all rational people should 
recognize and accept. Some of those transcendental theories seek to 
overcome plurality, either by showing that everyone should have the 
same values (Kant), that people who are different nonetheless have 
harmonious interests (Plato, Aristotle), or that differences are 
epiphenomenal, masking an underlying or ultimate unity (Hegel). Other 
transcendental theories seek to embrace plurality, at least to some degree. 
In that camp we find realist pluralists like Isaiah Berlin, with his apparent 
endorsement of negative liberty as the best response to the inevitability 
of moral disagreement,5 as well as John Gray,6 who argues that the 
plurality of real values means that no form of life (including the liberal 
preference for negative liberty) can claim preeminence.7 
The criticisms of these transcendental theories are numerous and 
complex. For purposes of the present essay, I merely want to note that 
many people have rejected transcendental explanations of and responses 
to plurality, and that some of those critics have turned to immanent 
theories as a possible alternative. Thus, over the last 20 years, there has 
been a surge of interest in the idea of immanence among political 
theorists. Put simply, immanence is the idea that there are no 
transcendental principles or agents relevant to human life, and that 
whatever norms, institutions, or critiques we generate must be explicated 
and defended without reference to such transcendentals. One suggestion 
that has been made in recent immanence literature, and the one that I will 
be concerned with in this essay, is that perhaps philosophies of 
immanence could help us with pluralism. 8 
This paper looks at three immanence theories- from Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and William 
Connolly. At first glance, these thinkers might seem an odd choice for 
such a comparison. On the one hand, Hardt/Negri and Deleuze/Guattari 
were strongly influenced by each other's work. They comment 
extensively on each other's writings, and in the 1980s Negri and Guattari 
co-wrote a book called Nouvelle espaces de liberte, published in English 
as Communists Like Us9 • For those reasons, it might seem that their ideas 
will be so similar that a comparison won't be fruitful. One the other 
hand, despite the fact that Connolly openly acknowledges the influence 
that Deleuze and Negri have had on his own work, his approach to these 
questions is quite different. For one thing, while Deleuze/Guattari and 
Negri/Hardt are all associated with Marxism understood broadly, 
Connolly is more typically associated with liberalism and social 
democracy. Similarly, Deleuze/Guattari and Hardt/Negri are working 
within the continental philosophical tradition, while Connolly is largely 
working within the Anglo-American analytic tradition (understood very 
broadly), though that's less true of his recent work. Finally, of all the 
thinkers, Connolly is the only one who has actively engaged in the 
largely Anglo-American debate about pluralism that this essay discusses. 
Despite those potential concerns, there are several compelling reasons 
to examine these particular thinkers. The most significant reason is that 
these thinkers have been the most prominent exponents of immanence 
politics over the past few decades. Negri, for example, has been 
developing an immanence politics at least since the late 1970s, when he 
was writing The Savage Anomaly, on Spinoza' s metaphysics and their 
relevance for politics. 10 His three recent and influential books with Hardt 
(Empire, Multitude, 11 and Commonwealth) explicitly call for a politics 
based on immanence (as discussed in more detail below). Deleuze (with 
his frequent collaborator Guattari) is probably the person most identified 
with the contemporary politics of immanence, and there is a substantial 
literature on his approach to that issue. 12 Finally, over the past 20 years 
Connolly has also become a major figure in the discussion of the politics 
of immanence, particular with the publication of his books Why I am Not 
a Secularist and Capitalism and Christianity, American Style. 
The second major reason to compare these particular thinkers is that 
the significant differences in their approaches allow us to get a synoptic 
view of immanence politics generally. Thus, for example, in working out 
a politics of immanence, Deleuze/Guattari and Hardt/Negri took very 
different directions. Deleuze and Guattari focused on, for want of a more 
accurate term, ontology, articulating a way of understanding the structure 
of the world and personal identity that could both explain radical 
difference and articulate principles for a new kind of politics. Although 
Hardt and Negri also examined ontology, for example in Negri's Savage 
Anomaly, which was translated into English by Hardt, their more recent 
work focuses on changes in the mode of production and the distribution 
of sovereign power- that is, on subjectivity and political possibility 
under current conditions. Thus the two pairs of thinkers present us with 
two very different approaches to justifying the politics of immanence­
one rooted in ontology, and the other rooted in historical contingency. 
Connolly's approach is less committed to a radical restructuring of either 
our ideas or our institutions. He addresses the same problems, and has 
roughly the same general strategy of achieving cooperation, justice, and 
freedom through a politics of immanence, but his focus is on identifying 
relatively small changes (of attitude, orientation, belief, processes of 
maintaining the self, and so on) that could generate those results. Thus, 
comparing these particular thinkers allows us to investigate whether a 
radical change in our view of ontology or current political conditions, or 
contrarily a more gradual and piecemeal conception of change, could 
allow a politics based in immanence to adequately address the problems 
ofvalue pluralism. 
GENERAL PROBLEMS 
It's helpful to think of immanence theories as tending towards three 
types or flavors, which of course blend together in different ways in any 
particular theory. The first tendency is towards declaration. Declarations 
are affirmative, even apodictic, claims about how the world is and what 
follows from that description. Spinoza's Ethics is a good example of this 
tendency- it offers a comprehensive ontology and metaphysics, along 
with arguments about what follows from those premises, while 
remaining an immanence theory by resolutely denying that there are any 
principles or agents in the universe other than those that emerge 
contingently. The second tendency is towards description. Descriptive 
theories say: here's how I think of the world; it's been helpful to me; 
perhaps you'll find it helpful too. Probably the best example of this 
tendency is Pyrrhonian skepticism, with its insistence that even its own 
claims cannot be known to be true, but that many people have found 
acting as if they were truly helpful. 13 The third tendency, which is 
roughly in between declaration and description, is invitation. Invitations 
say: here's what I believe; I can't prove my claims definitively, but here 
are some elements of my beliefs that I think you are likely already to 
agree with, and here are some reasons why you might come to agree with 
more of my beliefs after some reflection. Buddhism is a nice example of 
an invitation, with its initial claim that most people naturally come to see 
that life contains much suffering, its claim to have a method of relieving 
that suffering, and its emphasis on the point that each person must 
investigate that claim for him- or herself. 14 
Each tendency comes with its own characteristic problems. 
Declarations run into essentially the same problems as transcendental 
theories- making contestable assumptions, claiming more than they can 
prove (especially in terms of normative judgments), and hypostatizing 
the contingent into the necessary. At the opposite extreme, descriptions 
run the risk of being seen as poetry rather than philosophy. That is, to the 
extent that a philosophy of immanence is purely an optional perspective, 
one for which no truth-claims are made, it is open to the objection that 
while it may be of great help to its adherents, there is no reason to think 
that it will be widely enough adopted to be ofbroader social significance. 
Note that these problems are especially troublesome for a theory that 
aims to address the problem of value pluralism. For example, every 
philosophy rests on contestable premises, and any premise could in 
principle be contested. That's not a philosophical problem- without 
contestable assumptions no philosophy could get going in the first place. 
But it is a practical problem- to the extent that a philosophy rests on a 
larger number of contestable premises, or rests on premises that a larger 
number of people are in fact likely to contest, that philosophy will be less 
able to secure broad agreement under conditions of value pluralism. 
Finally, precisely because they take a midway position between 
declaration and description, invitations suffer from both sets of problems. 
When they make affirmative claims, they act like declarations. When 
they affirm their own contestability, they act like descriptions. Thus, at 
this very general level, the question is whether any immanence theory 
will be able to overcome these structural and logical problems to address 
the problem of value pluralism. 
HARDT AND NEGRI 
In Empire, Multitude, and the recently published Commonwealth, 15 
Hardt and Negri are explicitly attempting to articulate an immanence­
based vision of politics and political change. As I argue below, I believe 
that their argument is largely a declaration, and that it therefore 
encounters some significant problems typical of that approach. In these 
three books, Hardt and Negri are making four main claims: (1) that the 
dominant form of sovereignty is shifting from a disciplinary to a control 
model (Empire), whose primary focus is the production and management 
of subjectivities; (2) that this shift in sovereignty is one manifestation of 
a general shift from transcendence to immanence; (3) that this new form 
of sovereignty offers better opportunities for resistance and fundamental 
change than did the prior, nation-state system of sovereignty; (4) and that 
such an immanentist revolt by the multitude would result in a 
normatively better world than the current one. 
From Nation-States to Empire 
As Hardt and Negri themselves say, their primary focus is a shift in the 
dominant form of political sovereignty. 16 This new form of rule 
combines political, economic, and social/cultural spheres of production, 
distribution and control. It is characterized by two related currents of 
change. On the one hand, power is being centralized, because any given 
locus of power is increasingly likely to have effects on several different 
aspects of life. Multinational corporations, for example, embody not only 
the traditional functions of businesses, but also in some cases aspects of 
political sovereignty, and even functions traditionally associated with 
cultural or social production. On the other hand, power is being 
decentralized, because no particular locus of power is capable of 
exercising control either extensively (over the entire globe), or 
intensively (over every aspect oflife within its domain). 
From Transcendence to Immanence 
This shift from centralized and territorial nation-state to decentralized 
and deterritorialized Empire reflects a broader shift away from 
transcendence and towards immanence in all areas of life. Hardt and 
Negri discuss three different kinds of transcendence, all of which they 
believe are rapidly being abandoned. The first is the transcendence of the 
divine or supernatural over the human or natural. 17 The second area of 
shift from transcendence to immanence is in the relationship of the 
sovereign to the people. Finally, there is a shift from transcendence to 
immanence in the relationship between humanity and non-human nature . 
These three shifts away from transcendence add up to a general 
discarding of the concept. It is not simply that we are adopting immanent 
forms of power and control, but that we are abandoning transcendence as 
an idea. They write : "Not only the political transcendental but also the 
transcendental as such has ceased to determine measure." 18 In other 
words, the very idea that we can measure or evaluate the world according 
to some transcendental standard has become incredible, and is rapidly 
being abandoned in both theory and practice. 
New and Better Opportunities ofRevolt 
Part ofwhat makes the development of Empire worthy of examination 
is that it provides greater opportunities for resistance and change than 
did the nation-state model of sovereignty. 19 This is because the 
fundamental contradiction within Empire is not the spatial limits of 
capitalist expansion, but rather the inherent precariousness of a system 
whose stability and productivity rely on citizens being educated, 
independent, and creative, though never fully in control of their time, the 
products of their labor, or their desire to form community. They write: 
"Here we are thus faced with a paradox. Empire recognizes and profits 
from the fact that in cooperation bodies produce more and in community 
bodies enjoy more, but it has to obstruct and control this cooperative 
autonomy so as not to be destroyed by it."20 And, they predict: "The 
paradox is irresolvable: the more the world becomes rich, the more 
Empire, which is based on this wealth, must negate the conditions of the 
production ofwealth." 21 
Why the Immanent World ofthe Multitude Would be Better 
Like Marx, Hardt and Negri are somewhat ambiguous about their 
normative commitments. At times, they appear to be making a purely 
descriptive claim about how the natures of power and subjectivity are 
changing. But it is clear, and sometimes explicit, that they believe that 
this great, epochal shift from transcendence to immanence is a good 
thing. For example, in assessing the costs and benefits of the shift to 
Empire, they write: "Despite recognizing [the continued existence of 
domination under Empire], we insist on asserting that the construction of 
Empire is a step forward . .. "22 
However, their normative endorsement of revolt against Empire, and 
of the shift from transcendence to immanence generally, is complex. 
Hardt and Negri argue that no external or transcendent standard of 
normative preferability is available. Their argument rests on two 
premises. First, because we know that subjectivity is shaped by relations 
ofpower, we can have no access to or knowledge of the pre-social nature 
of humanity. Because of this, we have no basis for judging that one 
political system or another is more consonant with human nature. The 
second premise is that transcendent or metaphysical standards of value 
have, as a matter of fact, lost their normative force . In this sense, the 
general shift from transcendence to immanence is also a shift from 
metaphysics to ontology. 
If we cannot use any external standards, how are we to evaluate the 
normative significance of the rise of Empire? Their answer is relatively 
straightforward: whatever normative criterion we use must arise 
immanently from within our experience of life under Empire. "Ni dieu, 
ni maitre, ni I 'homme- no transcendent power or measure will determine 
the values of our world. Value will be determined only by humanity's 
own continuous innovation and creation. " 23 
More positively, Hardt and Negri identify a materialist teleology that 
ultimately serves as their normative criterion. The heart of this teleology, 
the telos towards which the multitude is always striving, is two desires: 
autonomy and community. On the one hand, the multitude living under 
Empire wants to be free: "When the new disciplinary regime constructs 
the tendency toward a global market of labor power, it constructs also the 
possibility of its antithesis. It constructs the desire to escape the 
disciplinary regime and tendentially an undisciplined multitude of 
workers who want to be free."24 On the other hand, the multitude 
continually seeks to create community free of the interference and 
domination of Empire: "Outside every Enlightenment cloud or Kantian 
reverie, the desire of the multitude is . . . a common species. " 25 
Hardt and Negri emphasize two related points about this materialist 
teleology: it is socially and historically constructed, and it is non­
dialectical. The first point, that the teleology is constructed, is essential to 
its being truly immanent. The second point, that the teleology is non­
dialectical, is crucial both to establish its immanent origins and to 
separate Empire from authoritarian Marxisms. Theirs is a teleology with 
a direction, but neither an end-point nor necessary s tages.26 
The teleology rests on three assumptions, which Hardt and Negri 
themselves occasionally assert openly, and which begin to undermine the 
teleology's ostensibly immanent origins. First, people want to be free, in 
the sense of having individual autonomy: "Disobedience to authority is 
one of the most natural and healthy acts. To us it seems completely 
obvious that those who are exploited will resist and- given the necessary 
conditions- rebel."27 Second, people want to create community: 
"Beyond the simple refusal, or as part of that refusal, we need also to 
construct a new mode of life and above all a new community. This 
project leads not toward the naked life of homo tantum [mere man] but 
toward homohomo, humanity squared, enriched by the collective 
intelligence and love of the community."28 Finally, although subjectivity 
is partially constituted socially and historically, there are limits to the 
possible forms of human life; even under unfavorable conditions, people 
will continue to want to be free and to form community: "The teleology 
of the multitude is theurgical; it consists in the possibility of directing 
technologies and production toward its own joy and its own increase of 
power. The multitude has no reason to look outside its own history and 
its own present productive power for the means necessary to lead toward 
its constitution as a political subject."29 This last claim opens onto a 
larger one: there is no likely change in relations of power or control that 
could quash or destroy the multitude's desire for freedom and 
community. Indeed, Hardt and Negri are silent on this issue. From their 
perspective, there appears to be no possibility that Empire might win . 30 
The question that I want to address is whether Hardt and Negri can get 
from this ostensibly descriptive characterization of conditions under 
Empire to their normative conclusion that Empire is a step forward, 
without violating their immanentist commitments. Below I argue that 
they cannot. 
General Problems and Possibilities ofImmanent Normativity 
The only way that we could make truly immanent normative 
judgments is if our normative criteria were genuinely contingent, such 
that they could be different under other circumstances. For example, if 
my society requires motorists to drive on the right side of the road, I have 
a real if contingent basis for normative judgment regarding someone who 
drives down my street on the left side. Normative judgments based on 
contingent principles suffer from two limitations. The first is that the 
judgments are limited and local- they are only relevant to the people 
who happen to hold the contingent principle serving as our criterion. To 
people outside that group, the various normative claims will appear 
spurious. This problem of the insistent locality of normative criteria leads 
to the second problem for immanent theories of judgment: there is no 
non-contentious way to rank conflicting or competing criteria. This 
problem arises for Hardt and Negri, though they do not acknowledge it. 
Their discussion of the changes in the process of subjection (the creation 
and management of subjectivities) only talks about the emerging 
subjectivity of the multitude, but of course there is another subjectivity 
that is also part of the process: that of the exploiters and managers of 
Empire. The exploiters must have a subjectivity that is different from that 
of the multitude, one for example that sees limiting autonomy and the 
creation of community as acceptable, necessary, and perhaps even good. 
By hypothesis, this subjectivity and the normative criteria that it 
acknowledges have emerged immanently, through the processes that 
constitute Empire, just as the subjectivity of the multitude has arisen. 
These two problems- the locality of immanent normative criteria and 
the existence of groups with incompatible and incommensurable 
criteria- undermine Hardt and Negri's normative project. Given that the 
immanent functioning of Empire produces two combating subjectivities, 
what basis do we have for choosing one over the other, for favoring the 
multitude over the exploiters? Whatever basis we end up identifying, it 
obviously cannot have been produced immanently within the situation, 
because that would merely re-pose the same question again, as one side 
favors the criterion and the other rejects it. Rather, any dispositive 
criterion must be based in some normative goal exterior- that is, 
transcendent- to Empire itself, such that it is capable of showing that 
one immanently generated perspective is normatively mistaken. Thus, on 
the one hand, whatever normative criteria do emerge immanently can 
only be applied locally and contingently (if we are committed to an 
immanent method ofjudgment), and, on the other hand, if more than one 
normative criterion is generated by the immanent working of the world, 
we will have no immanent basis for choosing among them. Hardt and 
Negri cannot justify their normative preference for the triumph of the 
multitude without appealing to some normative criterion that is at least 
partially independent of the situation they seek to analyze. At every turn, 
the insistent locality of the available normative criteria gets in the way of 
the aspiration to universality of the judgment. 
As I suggested above, I believe that this kind of problem- claiming 
more than they can prove- is typical of declaration-type immanence 
theories. It's hard to see how any theory could successfully argue that all 
normative principles are local and contingent but also that some of those 
principles are nonetheless absolutely preferable to the others. Hardt and 
Negri show us the limit of this kind of immanent theorizing. 
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI 
Deleuze and Guattari propose a different and more sophisticated 
method of making immanent normative judgments, one that aspires to 
avoid the problem Hardt and Negri encounter, though it takes some 
explaining to get to it. Although this is not how Deleuze and Guattari 
themselves would proceed, it is easiest for me to summarize their work 
by presenting it as a system. Let's start with the Cosmos, 3 1 which is 
everything. The most basic elements/constituents of the Cosmos are 
flows, which are quanta of energy in motion. Deleuze famously argues 
that the genetic element of everything is difference, 32 and that point is 
easy to understand at this very simple level. It doesn't make sense to 
attribute essence or identity to a quantum of energy, since any such 
statements would be so abstract as to be meaningless. But it does make 
sense to note differences that differentiate the quantum from other quanta 
(and instances of void); thus for example it makes sense to talk about a 
quantum occupying a particular part of three-dimensional space precisely 
because other quanta do not occupy that area, it makes sense to talk 
about a quantum having a particular frequency or wavelength because 
that clarifies how it might interact with other quanta from which it 
differs, and further it makes sense to talk about a quantum of energy 
moving in a direction, but only relative to other quanta (since there are 
no absolute directions in space). 
There are countless flows , which are themselves apparently without 
any prior cause. As the flows interact (apparently not according to any 
necessity or laws), they give rise to other/different flows and also to 
assemblages33 in which two or more flows enter into a more-or-less 
temporary, shifting, contingent relationship. There are lots of different 
kinds of assemblages, and it seems that matter and its various 
compositions are all assemblages. 
Essentially the same relationship gets reproduced on (at least) three 
different levels- inorganic nature, organic nature, and human society. At 
each level, the compositions are contingent and unstable, and of course 
each level interacts with the other levels. Similarly, all 
compositions/assemblages are comprised of heterogeneous elements, so 
they are always open to influence from external sources, and they always 
contain lines of flight (tendencies or possibilities of decomposition or 
rearrangement) . In principle all assemblages are influenced by all other 
assemblages (another reason that difference is constitutive- the idea of 
self-sufficient identity is an illusion), though in practice some influences 
are infinitesimal (such as the gravitational pull of distant stars). 
Deleuze and Guattari talk about two different planes of the 
organization of matter I flows I assemblages- the plane of consistency I 
immanence I composition (sometimes also called the earth or the Body 
without Organs or matter)/ 4 and the plane of stratification (sometimes 
also called the strata). 35 It's ambiguous whether these are meant to be 
understood as conceptual but universal (so that every assemblage 
stretches between them, and they are constituted by the totality of 
assemblages), or whether they are merely ideal-types that indicate the 
two poles of assemblage-ness (the m1n1mum degree of interaction 
necessary for flows to maintain a relationship with each other, and a 
maximum degree ofhypostatization of the assemblage as an identity).36 
There are two basic kinds of assemblage: molar and molecular. Molar 
assemblages are large scale, but are also aimed at system- at creating a 
comprehensive system within which particularities can be 
comprehended, classified, and managed. Molecular assemblages are 
small scale, but they are also particularistic- they are concerned with 
themselves, not with either subordinating other assemblages or 
subordinating themselves to a larger assemblage. Every assemblage has 
both molar and molecular aspects I tendencies, and the terms are 
relative- an assemblage can be molar with respect to some assemblages 
and molecular with respect to others. (The nation state is a good 
example- it's molar with respect to its own population, but molecular 
with respect to other nation states.) 
Every assemblage can be thought of as being made of three kinds of 
lines or tendencies of movement. Molar lines move the assemblage 
towards stratification, molecular lines move the assemblage towards an 
emphasis on the particular, and thus towards the plane of 
consistency/immanence, and lines of flight move the assemblage towards 
dissolution, towards metamorphosing into a different assemblage. (In 
some places Deleuze and Guattari seem to suggest that molecular lines 
and lines of flight are the same. In other places, they suggest that lines of 
flight can only be instantiated in molecular parts of the assemblage, and 
thus they coincide without being identical.) In essence, there are always 
these three tendencies in any assemblage- towards hypostatization and 
domination over other assemblages, towards a focus on its own 
particularity, and towards dissolution and entering into new assemblages. 
So, roughly, flows cohere into assemblages, which are primarily 
molecular. Relationships among assemblages lead to the formation of 
molar strata, which capture I constrain assemblages (even though of 
course ultimately they just are those assemblages in a particular 
formation). At each level, the relationships are contingent and not based 
on any underlying identity or necessity. Since the elements making up 
each assemblage I stratum are heterogeneous, the larger units always 
contain conflicting elements and therefore lines of flight. Thus there are 
constant processes of coding (forming strata), decoding (elements 
escaping from a stratum) and recoding ("free" elements being 
incorporated into a new stratum). 
What is left out of this ontology is just as important as what is 
included: there is no god, no transcendent source of morality, and very 
little by way of intrinsic natural laws (other than those that emerge 
contingently and are always in the process of modification). Deleuze and 
Guattari are explicit that this view of the world is meant to be strictly 
immanent, and also that their goal is provoking us to thought and 
reconsideration more than achieving a faithful depiction of the actual. 
The point of developing this unusual metaphysics is ultimately political. 
At the risk of simplifying too far, it seems to me that Deleuze and 
Guattari are fighting against two related though distinct problems. The 
first is the macro-level problem of the permanent war society, and the 
second is the universal micro-level problem of each of us being 
constrained into the terms of our current identities and self­
understandings, and thereby having possible avenues of change blocked. 
Explaining the problem of the permanent war society requires some 
backtracking. In analyzing the origins of the modem state, Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that the state as a molar organization coevolved with what 
they call the nomadic war machine, which is a molecular organization. 
The state's drive is towards capture- bringing people, land, institutions, 
and so on together in order to control them and to harvest surplus from 
them. The war machine's drive is towards maintaining smooth space­
that is, towards perpetuating the molecular groupings and interactions 
that exist before/outside of/despite/in response to the state. They are at 
pains to argue that the two phenomena evolved at the same time and in 
response to each other, and that every human community contains some 
elements ofboth. 
Although the war machine is not defined by the conduct of actual war, 
it is defined by hostility to molarity and the state. When the two forms 
come into conflict, actual war does erupt. In response to actual war, the 
state needs to develop its own war machine, which it can do either by 
incorporating an existing machine (hiring mercenaries, conscripting the 
previously nomadic residents of a new territory) or by creating a new one 
itself. If the state does not succeed in capturing a war machine, it will be 
destroyed by the nomads. But, and this is crucial, the motivating logics 
of the state and of the war machine are completely different. The state is 
molar while the war machine is molecular; the state seeks capture while 
the war machine seeks to avoid being captured; the state sees violence as 
subordinated to a larger goal while the war machine sees violence as a 
basic constituent of its identity. 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that in the contemporary world, the war 
machines of the various states have actually become primary over the 
capture functions . In a sense, the state now exists to serve the military. 
But, again crucially, the militaries of the various states have more in 
common with each other than they do with the civilian leadership of their 
respective states. In this sense, we have something closer to one 
enormous war machine ofwhich the various national states and militaries 
are merely instantiations. Increasingly, they argue, we are led by the 
internal logic of the war machine.37 
Deleuze and Guattari point out that although this domination of the 
worldwide war machine constitutes a line of flight from the state, it 
appears to be a negative line, one that leads to death rather than to new 
possibilities. This is consistent with their definition of fascism (adopted 
from Paul Virilio) as being a suicidal form of social organization, one in 
which violence itself is the organizing principle and goal. Implicitly, 
then, they fear that the world has created a system for itself that is 
increasingly shutting off avenues for change and leading us towards 
literal destruction. 
Their micro-scale concern is similar to this macro-level fear. They 
worry that many aspects of life- from the way we conceive of 
philosophy, to the organization of capitalism, to psychology, linguistics, 
and even our conception of revolution- are encouraging us to reify and 
solidify our existing identities, institutions, habits, ideas, dreams, and so 
on, thereby shutting down avenues of connection to others (even others 
of very different orders, such as non-human animals, plants, etc.). The 
danger is both that we will deny the fact of the very real connections that 
tie us to everything else in the cosmos, and that in doing so we will deny 
ourselves countless avenues for possible development and change. 
Closing down those avenues of connection and change restrict our 
possibilities of desire, power, and freedom- all understood in Deleuze 
and Guattari's special uses of those terms. 
Desire, power, and freedom are all different aspects of the same 
underlying quality of assemblages I bodies (a quality closely analogous 
to Spinoza's conatus). It helps to take another step back here, this time to 
cosmology again. The simplest assemblages are two different quanta of 
energy that become connected in some way- to simplify, let's say one is 
an electron and the other is a proton. When they come into interaction 
with one another, their relative energies get combined in whatever way 
they allow- in this case, the electron orbits the proton, forming a 
hydrogen atom. (If two electrons had come into contact with each other, 
they would not have been able to form a stable combination, and no 
assemblage would result.) That atom will come into contact with other 
atoms and quanta, and eventually it will become involved in larger and 
larger assemblages (obviously not all atoms have this experience). At 
each level, what determines what the assemblage does? Well, the 
interactions between the assemblage's internal qualities (energy, mass, 
etc.) and those of the external quanta and assemblages that it comes into 
contact with. That's true at every level- quantum, atom, molecule, 
single-celled organism, tiger, human society, etc. Some assemblages can 
interact with a larger array of outside elements than can other 
assemblages, and some assemblages do so interact (and thus change) 
more often or easily than do others. 
These three qualities- the internal energies/composition of the 
assemblage, the number of external elements that the assemblage can 
interact with, and the easy/ frequency with which the assemblage does 
interact with outside elements (and thereby changes) correspond to 
desire, power, and freedom. Desire is the internal capacity or disposition 
to interact with external elements in certain ways, power is the relative 
capacity of the assemblage to interact with more or fewer external 
elements, and freedom is the actual frequency of those interactions and 
changes.38 To the extent that existing avenues of connection and change 
are closed down, and to the extent that we are discouraged from opening 
up new ones, our desire is inhibited, our power is reduced, and we are 
less free . Deleuze and Guattari' s main concern is that this is precisely 
what is happening today. 
Their proposed solution is partial and not entirely satisfying. They 
argue forcefully that both smooth space and striated space (that is, both 
molecular assemblages and molar ones) are essential for life, and that 
there is no possibility of pure smoothness or pure molecularity.39 Rather, 
what we can hope for is a constant process of seeking new connections, 
new avenues, new changes, of undermining existing blockages and 
seeking to prevent new ones. All of these processes are summed up in 
what Deleuze and Guattari call "becoming. " 40 There can be no final 
becoming, no stable state in which no further changes are either 
necessary or possible. Rather, becoming is a process that we can pursue 
but never complete. At the moment, and probably under most 
circumstances, becoming will be associated with moving towards the 
smooth and the molecular, and away from the striated and the molar. But 
under other circumstances, moving in the opposite direction might be 
how becoming is best achieved. 
So, how can all of this help us with plurality? That depends in part on 
what kind of theory Deleuze and Guattari are putting forward. Although 
they are insistent that their ontology is intended to spur thinking rather 
than to make truth-claims (that is, that it is a description rather than a 
declaration), I think that we cannot entirely take them at their word. Ifwe 
don't take most of the elements of their worldview as being accurate 
descriptions of the actual, their conclusions make no sense. If there really 
is a god, if there really are transcendent moral laws, if organisms were 
created and have inborn natures, and so on, their conceptions of desire, 
power, and freedom are deeply problematic, and there's no obvious 
reason that we should adopt them. To get to their normative preference 
for becoming, we have to accept their ontology as being a more-or-less 
true depiction of the world. That is, we have to treat it as a declaration. 
That's not necessarily a problem. Their ideas have to be based on 
something, and the details of their ontology are compelling in many 
places. However, as with Hardt and Negri, a problem arises about the 
status of their normative preferences.41 Deleuze bases his preference for 
becoming on the Nietzschean will to power, understood roughly as I 
have explained desire, power, and freedom above- as a contingent, 
internal quality of assemblages.42 As Daniel Smith puts the point: "A 
mode of existence can be evaluated, apart from transcendental or 
universal values, by the purely immanent criteria of its power or capacity 
(puissance), that is, by the manner in which it actively deploys its power 
by going to the limit ofwhat it can do (or, on the contrary, by the manner 
in which it is cut off from its power to act and is reduced to 
impotence)."4 3 In other words, just by their immanent, contingent, 
internal functioning, assemblages will always seek that course of action 
that (appears to) permit their becoming. 
The question is whether that makes sense as a normative criterion. To 
see the problem, remember that we expect normative principles to be 
able to support two different kinds of judgments-one is about what I 
should prefer for myself, and the other is about what I should prefer for 
others. It seems obvious that Deleuze's immanent criterion ofpreferring 
becoming provides a normative principle that any subject could use to 
make judgments about what he/she/ it preferred for him/her/ itself. Faced 
with a choice, and assuming that Deleuze is correct about the inner 
motivation of assemblages, I will always choose the course of action that 
(appears to) permit my own becoming. But- and here we are back on 
very familiar ground- there is another question: Is there any reason that 
I must prefer (or act to support) the becoming of others? This is the 
traditional objection to hedonic theories of normative judgment. We can 
understand why one would prefer hedonic goods for oneself, but not why 
one should want those goods for others, especially when that may 
conflict with one getting them oneself. 
It won't do to object that this way of putting the problem is defective 
because Deleuze and Guattari are precisely trying to undermine these 
kinds of hypostatized divisions between subject and object, self and 
other. At any given moment, there exist certain assemblages with certain 
qualities (some of which are mutually contradictory); it is those 
assemblages that must make normative choices, or about which we other 
assemblages must make normative judgments. It's plausible (though far 
from certain) that all assemblages have an innate preference for 
maximizing their own becoming, which of course entails that they would 
change into new assemblages to some degree. But it does not follow 
from that premise that all assemblages have an innate preference for 
maximizing the becoming of the other assemblages that happen to exist 
in this moment of time. An assemblage currently following a molar line 
of flight will seek to subsume other assemblages as part of its own 
(perhaps misguided) conception of its own path to becoming, even if 
being subsumed is not consistent with those other assemblages' 
conceptions of the best path to their own becomings. Two assemblages 
will compete over limited resources that both need for their survival. 
Being committed to becoming doesn't mean accepting a suicidal 
fatalism, the view that any change is ipso facto for the good. 
If every assemblage seeks its own becoming, but most or all 
assemblages will disregard the becoming of other assemblages when it 
comes into (perhaps only apparent) conflict with their own, then there is 
no normative principle here. We have a principle of action, but not a 
principle of judgment; hedonic relativism, not immanent criteria for 
normative evaluation. 
Thus, it seems that Deleuze and Guattari are caught in two dilemmas. 
First, although they portray their theory as a description, it seems clear 
that it can only have the practical effect they hope for it ifwe treat it as a 
declaration. Thus, their theory encounters one of the typical problems of 
descriptions- they must either be consigned to being mere poetry, or 
they must abandon their nature and become descriptions. Second, the 
theory's normative force rests on convincing us to favor becoming, both 
for ourselves and for others. Yet that principle appears to be under­
theorized- it is not at all clear why we should prefer the becoming of 
others, especially in cases where it appears to interfere with our own. 
Thus, Deleuze and Guattari appear to have encountered a typical 
problem of declaration theories, by claiming (perhaps "suggesting" is 
better) more than they can prove. Whereas Hardt and Negri have given 
us too much- a normative judgment that cannot be supported by 
immanent criteria- Deleuze and Guattari have given us too little : an 
immanent criterion that cannot support normative judgment. Neither 
approach is able to help us with the problems of pluralism, since neither 
is able to justify any particular course of action to people whose initial 
normative judgments and commitments differ. 
CONNOLLY 
William Connolly's version of immanence is an example of an 
invitation theory. For purposes of analysis, we might say that Connolly's 
theory starts with some basic ontological commitments. Connolly 
identifies himself as an immanent naturalist. For him, naturalism means 
that there is no god or supernatural force at work in the universe. Thus he 
writes : "By naturalism I mean the faith that nature and human culture 
survive without the aid (or obstruction) of a divine force."44 This means 
both that there is no god to either save or damn us, but also that there is 
no transcendent source of normative values or judgments that we must 
consult.45 His use of immanent is slightly different from the way I have 
been using it so far. He argues that the universe is "unruly," and that its 
actions probably exceed the description of "lawlike statements. " 4 6 Thus 
by immanence he means: "a world of becoming in which the existing 
composition of actuality is exceeded by open, energized potentialities 
simmering in it."47 
Connolly not only admits but celebrates the fact that these ontological 
or metaphysical commitments are contestable. Part of the motivation for 
that position is his point, made in a number of recent books including 
Why I Am Not a Secularis t ,48 Pluralis m , and Capitalism and Chris tianity: 
American Style, that everyone has basic commitments whose truth or 
necessity they cannot prove. In recent work, he refers to these basic 
commitments as an existential faith : "By existential faith I mean an 
elemental sense of the ultimate character of being. "4 9 And he argues that 
everyone has some kind of existential faith: "To be human is to be 
inhabited by existential faith. There is no vacuum in this domain, though 
there might very well be ambivalence, uncertainty, and internal 
plurality." 5° Connolly emphasizes that existential faiths are not merely 
epistemological beliefs, but are also organizations of bodily experience 
and habit, which exist on registers below that of discursive 
consciousness.51 And those faiths are deeply contestable, since they rest 
upon beliefs and assumptions for which there is not (and may not ever 
be) evidence that is overwhelmingly conclusive. 
On my reading, Connolly celebrates this contestability (even of his 
own deepest beliefs) for a handful of related reasons. First, the 
contestability of existential faiths is itself an instance of the immanence 
of the universe, the way in which the universe is always full of more 
possibilities (and actualities) than we can systematize or account for. As 
Nietzsche, one of Connolly's acknowledged inspirations, argues, there 
are only two ways to respond to this overwhelming fecundity of the 
universe: love or resentment. Like Nietzsche, Connolly chooses love. A 
second reason that Connolly embraces the contestability of immanent 
naturalism is because of his views on identity. As laid out most fully in 
his Identity/Difference, 52 Connolly subscribes to the view that identity is 
always fashioned through differentiation and distinction. If that approach 
is even roughly correct, then the fact that there are others who contest my 
most fundamental commitments is constitutive of me as a self. From this 
perspective, plurality is both a problem and the condition of possibility 
for identity. There are no non-plural solutions to the problems of 
plurality. A third reason that Connolly celebrates the contestability of 
immanent naturalism is because he believes that the shared experience of 
having our most cherished beliefs challenged may itself become a basis 
for cooperation and respect across difference.53 
More generally, Connolly's approach to plurality is to seek a fair 
settlement among existing identities/constituencies while also remaining 
attuned to the possible emergence of new identities, rights, demands and 
needs. These two elements are what Connolly refers to as pluralism and 
pluralization.54 To achieve these two goals, which are related but also in 
tension with one another, Connolly suggests that two sensibilities or 
ethics (he also calls them civic virtues) would be especially helpful: 
agonistic respect and critical responsiveness. In a recent formulation, he 
writes about agonistic respect: "An ethos of agonistic respect grows out 
ofmutual appreciation for the ubiquity of faith to life and the inability of 
contending parties, to date, to demonstrate the truth of one faith over 
other live candidates. It grows out of reciprocal appreciation for the 
element of contestability in these domains. The relation is agonistic in 
two senses: you absorb the agony of having elements of your own faith 
called into question by others, and you fold agonistic contestation of 
others into the respect that you convey toward them." 55 If agonistic 
respect is about attending to existing differences, critical responsiveness 
is about being attuned to new ones, whose development and emergence 
will always necessarily be disruptive and disorienting. He writes: 
"Critical responsiveness takes the form of careful lis tening and 
presumptive g enerosity to constituencies struggling to move from an 
obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of recognition, justice, 
obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a place on one or more of those 
registers." 56 
These ethics are explicitly optional- they are ways of approaching the 
world that Connolly believes are helpful to achieving social cooperation 
given conditions of both plurality and pluralization, but there is no moral 
imperative to adopt them, and no assurance that the experience of 
difference will somehow spontaneously generate them. To some extent 
we can draw them from existing belief systems and institutions, and to 
some extent we must create them for ourselves, through micropolitical 
techniques of self-fashioning (following Nietzsche and Foucault), 
through arguing for our ideals, through creating partial alliances with 
others with whom we have some shared beliefs, and through political 
struggle to enact our preferred policies. Connolly describes this difficult 
balancing act of simultaneously holding one's own beliefs, engaging in a 
respectful agonism with people who hold other beliefs, and all the while 
remaining open to the emergence of unforeseen new identities and 
beliefs, as developing a "bicameral" understanding of ourselves. 57 
In contrast to this hopeful vision of what we might achieve, the great 
dangers are existential resentment and eviL Existential resentment- what 
Connolly also sometimes calls the drive for existential revenge 58 - arises 
when the contingency of both identity and existence threatens to 
overwhelm us, and we respond by trying to fix identity, trying to police 
difference, and with resentment against a world that contains such 
maddening indeterminacy. When resentment reaches an extreme level, it 
becomes evil: "The tendency to evil within faith is this: The instances in 
which the faith of others incites you to anathematize it as inferior or evil 
can usher into being the demand to take revenge against them for the 
internal disturbance they sow, even if they have not otherwise limited 
your ability to express your faith."59 Importantly, evil is a possibility for 
every faith, not just for those whose explicit commitments call for the 
curtailing of difference. 
Of course, despite his willingness to openly embrace the contestability 
of his commitments, Connolly advocates for them forcefully. His general 
commitments- roughly social-democratic, radically pluralistic, 
ecologically-minded- have been clear from his earliest work. How 
exactly we get from here to there is necessarily a bit vague. Connolly 
emphasizes the importance of visualizing both the future we want and 
the interim steps we might feasibly start taking in that direction. 
Although the term visualization has an unfortunate New-Age 
connotation, Connolly's point is more Foucauldian: one of the ways in 
which we change ourselves to become people capable of making and 
sustaining a radically different kind ofworld is by retraining ourselves to 
appreciate and understand that kind of world. If that is an important 
micropolitical strategy, perhaps we can move towards macropolitics by 
forming limited, strategic alliances with others whose ideals, creeds, or 
spiritualities we find congeniaL As Connolly has argued about the left, 
these alliances would probably be both partial and temporary, but they 
would allow us to get some real political work done, they might open up 
some space for developing ties with people from whom we otherwise 
feel estranged, and accepting a piecemeal approach allows us to 
overcome the lingering and limiting assumption that we need unity above 
all else.60 Eventually, these movements towards change would have to be 
implemented by state power, though we would of course need to 
remember both the contestability of these particular settlements and these 
particular constituencies, and we would also need to be attentive to the 
changing nature of political states. 6 1 Finally, on the philosophical front, 
an important strategy is simply articulating and defending immanent 
naturalism as a realistic contender among worldviews. 62 
Connolly acknowledges the problem of making an optional worldview 
useful, and offers concrete reasons to believe that others might be drawn 
to it. He writes: 
But what could attract multiple constituencies to such an agenda? 
Negotiation of such an ethos of pluralism, first, honors the 
embedded character of faith; second, gives expression to a fugitive 
element of care, hospitality, or love for difference simmering in 
most faiths; third, secures specific faiths against persecution; and 
fourth, offers the best opportunity for diverse faiths to coexist 
without violence while supporting the civic conditions of common 
63governance. 
Further, despite acknowledging his profound debts to both Spinoza64 
and Deleuze,65 Connolly gently criticizes both for their failure or 
inability to acknowledge the contestability of their philosophies. In 
general, he says, "no single existential faith to date, including radical 
immanence, has been demonstrated so convincingly that it would be 
foolish for any individual or congregation to deny it."66 
As I suggested earlier in this essay, as an invitation theory, Connolly's 
approach is subject to two different sets of objections. On the one hand, 
to the extent that he affirms substantive claims and commitments, like a 
declaration theory, he has to make assertions that reasonable people 
could contest, which thus reduces the utility of his theory as a solution to 
the problem of value pluralism. On the other hand, to the extent that he 
emphasizes the contestability of his claims and commitments, he risks 
making his theory merely a description- an optional perspective on the 
world that only the already-likeminded would be likely to support. That 
approach would also limit the utility of his theory as a response to value 
pluralism. Thus, at least at first glance, it seems as if Connolly's theory 
may also demonstrate that immanence theories are not likely to be a 
helpful response to the problems of pluralism. 
CONCLUSION 
Where does all of this leave us? I suggest that we can draw three 
conclusions. First, descriptive immanence theories seem unlikely to 
succeed in resolving the problems of value pluralism, for the anticipated 
reason that the claims they make are so tentative that there's no strong 
reason to believe that they will generate agreement from those whose 
judgments initially disagree. Such theories avoid the obvious problem of 
making strong claims that will drive away people with opposing 
commitments, but at the expense of claiming so little that they are unable 
to become the basis of a new agreement. 
Second, neither the theory of Hardt and Negri nor the theory of 
Deleuze and Guattari was able to generate an immanent criterion that 
could ground adequately general normative judgments. As I argued 
above, Hardt and Negri's theory delivered too much- it gave us a 
criterion that could ground normative judgments, but the criterion could 
not be derived from the immanence theory they provided to justify it. In 
contrast, Deleuze and Guattari's theory delivered too little- it gave us a 
truly immanent criterion, but one that could not sustain the kinds of 
normative judgments we would need to achieve agreement under 
conditions of plurality. More broadly, it's hard to see how any 
immanence theory could avoid the horns of this dilemma. A criterion that 
is immanent can't justify a claim to its superiority over other criteria­
since that would imply a yet superior criterion for ranking them, and that 
criterion's superiority would either have to be immanent, and thus 
contestable within that immanent framework, or universal and therefore 
transcendental- and therefore can't ground normative judgments that 
have a plausible claim to universality. Conversely and for the same 
reasons, it appears to be impossible to generate a universal normative 
judgment based on an immanent normative criterion. 
Based on these first two conclusions, it seems that neither declarative 
nor descriptive immanence theories can help us solve the problem of 
value pluralism, since neither can provide a plausible basis for achieving 
universal agreement. Ultimately, that's not entirely surprising, since 
other attempts to resolve the problems of value pluralism run into 
essentially the same difficulties. 67 
By way of a third overall conclusion, I want to suggest that we take a 
closer look at Connolly's invitation theory. As I pointed out above, it 
initially appears to be doubly damned, since it is exposed to the problems 
of both descriptive and declarative theories. However, we might instead 
conclude that invitation theories are wily, in that they attempt to 
maximize agreement while minimizing disagreement. Elsewhere I have 
argued for "layered pluralism," 68 which is the idea that we cannot expect 
to achieve universal assent either to principles or to 
procedures/institutions, but we may be able to achieve partial but 
overlapping assent or acquiescence to several different components of 
social stability. For example, some people might assent to (or acquiesce 
in) the moral values that animate the state (and some other people might 
assent to some but not all of those values). Some of those people, and 
some others, might assent to the major institutions of the political and 
economic system (and again, some others might assent to some but not 
all). Some of those people, and some others, might assent to the practical 
working out of the political system, for example to their personal, daily 
experiences with police officers, school teachers, bureaucrats, and so on 
(and again, some others might assent to some but not all of these things). 
Whereas someone like Rawls argues that to achieve stable cooperation 
we need everyone to assent to the same small number of things 
(fundamental values), 69 layered pluralism argues that we may be able to 
achieve a stable society as long as most citizens assent, most of the time, 
to at least some critical mass of the many things that make up the system 
of social cooperation. 
Given the failure of both transcendental and immanence theories to 
propose a comprehensive solution to the problem of value pluralism­
that is, a compelling reason why people should in fact agree in their 
moral judgments- something like layered pluralism may be the best that 
we can hope for: agreement where we can get it, acquiescence where we 
can' t, and an attempt to minimize outright opposition through 
compromise. If it's correct that a partial, overlapping, pluralism is the 
best we can do, then an invitation theory like Connolly's may offer us the 
best path to achieving it. By making ontological and ethical claims, 
Connolly moves away from the purely poetic pole of description. By 
acknowledging the contestability of those claims, he carefully avoids the 
tendency of declarative theories to claim more than they can prove. By 
putting himself between those two extremes, Connolly has crafted a true 
invitation- a theory that stakes some claims, acknowledges its limits, 
and points out reasons why people who initially disagree with some or all 
of it might nonetheless either come to agree with (some of) it, as well as 
reasons why cooperation might still be possible despite continued 
disagreement. His approach shows how immanence theories can defuse 
possible problems, for example by staking positive claims but 
acknowledging their contestability, and then using the shared pain of 
acknowledging the contestability of one's views as the basis for a 
possible experience of unity and similarity among people otherwise 
separated by their ideas. As Connolly himself points out, there's no 
guarantee that this approach will work, but his efforts to manage the 
problems of immanence theories suggest that his style of theorizing may 
stand the best chance of succeeding. 
For those of us who hold out the hope that moral unanimity could 
eventually be achieved, perhaps under better social, economic, and 
political conditions, this may be a profoundly disappointing result. But 
that, I believe, is precisely the challenge that value pluralism poses. The 
fact that people disagree in their moral judgments, and that those 
disagreements at least some of the time appear to be rooted in conflicting 
moral beliefs rather than merely in error or thoughtlessness, raises the 
question ofhow we could ever achieve consensus. If we are unwilling to 
simply impose our views, due either to moral or prudential scruples, then 
we will need arguments about why people should agree with us. The 
extensive literature on value pluralism has attempted to identify those 
arguments without success. As I believe the argument above has shown, 
neither descriptive nor declarative immanence theories get us closer to 
achieving agreement. That suggests both that we should change our 
expectations and look to achieve something like layered pluralism, and 
also that an invitation theory like Connolly's offers the approach that is 
the most likely to maximize agreement while minimizing disagreement 
and leaving room for renegotiation. There is much to dislike in this 
solution, but that may be the nature of the world we live in. 
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